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Furner: The Ontology of Documents, Revisited

I should like to thank Fidélia and the organizers of DOCAM 2019 for inviting me
to give this talk. It is an honor to be here in Toulon and to have this opportunity to
start a conversation about what I am calling the ontology of documents. The title of
the talk is “The ontology of documents, revisited” which is gesturing towards the
fact that I am far from the first to give a talk on that topic. The philosopher Barry
Smith has been talking about the ontology of documents since at least 2005, and
part of my goal today is to shine the DOCAM lamp on his work.
The talk is divided into three sections. First of all, building from Michael
Buckland’s well-known paper “What is a document?,” I shall present a brief survey
of definitions of “document” from the last century or so. My conclusion from this
will be that those definitions which most accurately reflect the ways in which the
term “document” is used in practice are typically compound definitions, consisting
of two or three elements. This is because documents are complex objects, not
simple ones. Each element of a definition refers to a different mode or function of
documents: (a) document-as-carrier, or medium, (b) document-as-text, or message,
and (c) document-as-content, or meaning.
The second section of the talk introduces the idea of category theory, a
branch of the philosophical subfield of ontology, whose contributors work towards
the identification of the most fundamental categories of things that exist (or could
possibly exist) in the world. One celebrated contributor to category theory is the
philosopher E. J. Lowe, and I shall look at his so-called four-category ontology
with a view to locating documents’ place in it. As we shall see, this is not as easy
as it might initially appear to be, but my tentative conclusion is that documents are
universals, not particulars. (And I just want to note from the outset that I shall be
using that term “universal” in the narrow philosophical sense, referring to a
metaphysical category, not a linguistic or cultural one. At the same time, this is not
an argument that the concept of “document” is a universal in the philosophical
sense. Rather, it is an argument that Moby-Dick, and every one of the trillions of
documents that are produced daily, is each itself a universal.)
Thirdly, I shall switch from consideration of Lowe’s work in ontology to
look at that of philosopher Barry Smith, who has written specifically about the
ontology of documents. At first it might seem as if Smith is working with a
narrower definition of “document” than we are used to in library and information
science (LIS), but I argue that ultimately we may have much to learn by taking
Smith’s approach, one takeaway being that what Smith calls document acts are
analogous to speech acts and should be viewed as events or occurrents as opposed
to objects or continuants, but another, more importantly, being that all documents,
not just the ones that are involved in the kinds of acts that Smith identifies as
declarations, are creative in the special sense that they are generative of quasiabstract entities of the kind that collectively comprise social reality.
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The goal of all of this though is not to draw definite conclusions, but to
contribute to a solidification of connections between LIS and literatures that might
not previously have loomed large on our collective radar, and to spark
conversations about this material, so I shall be more than happy if I manage to do
that, and I hope that you shall be somewhat satisfied too.
I
Definitions of “document”
The initial touchstone when it comes to any discussion of definitions of “document”
is Michael Buckland’s seminal and highly-cited 1997 paper (Buckland, 1997). This
will be so familiar to everyone, more than twenty years later, that I hesitate to give
more than the most cursory review, but I do think it is worth reminding ourselves
what Buckland’s goal was with this article and what he consequently chose to leave
out.
Buckland explicitly poses the question “What is a document?” in the context
of a historical discussion of the limits of documentation, as that activity was
pursued and developed in the first half of the twentieth century. He asserts (p. 804)
that such discussion is still “relevant to the clarification of the nature and scope of
information systems,” given the way documentation has developed in the second
half of the twentieth century, but (apart from brief consideration of “contemporary”
definitions drawing from semiotics) restricts his survey of definitions of
“document” to those emerging from the documentation movement prior to the mid1960s.
So Buckland begins by considering the oeuvre of Paul Otlet (1868–1944),
the Belgian visionary well-known to all of us, who with Henri La Fontaine founded
the Institut international de bibliographie in 1895—which in 1931 became the
Institut, and in 1937 the Fédération, internationale de documentation—and who
wrote the Traité de documentation, published in 1934. For Otlet, says Buckland,
the category of “document” includes not just graphic and written records (i.e.,
representations of ideas or of objects) but also the objects themselves—“if you are
informed by observation of them” (Buckland, p. 805). For example: “natural
objects, artifacts, objects bearing traces of human activity (such as archaeological
finds), explanatory models, educational games, and works of art” (Buckland, p.
805)— that is, objects “not intended as communication” (p. 807). Comparing
Otlet’s ideas to some of those promoted by modern-day cultural anthropologists
and museologists, Buckland further quotes Otlet:
“Collections of objects brought together for purposes of
preservation, science and education are essentially documentary in
character (Museums and Cabinets, collections of models, specimens
and samples). These collections are created from items occurring in
nature rather than being delineated or described in words; they are
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three dimensional documents.” (Otlet, 1920; translated in Otlet,
1990; cited by Buckland, 1997, p. 807)
Year

Author

Definition

1935

Schürmeyer (trans.
Buckland, 1997)

“any material basis for extending our knowledge which is
available for study or comparison”

1937

Institut
international
de
coopération
intellectuelle
/
Union française
des organismes de
documentation

“Any source of information, in material form, capable of being
used for reference or study or as an authority. Examples:
manuscripts, printed matter, illustrations, diagrams, museum
specimens, etc.”

1942

Donker
Duyvis
(trans. Voorhoeve,
1964)

“the repository of an expressed thought”

1951

Briet
(trans.
Buckland, 1997)

“evidence in support of a fact”; i.e., “any physical or symbolic
sign, preserved or recorded, intended to represent, to reconstruct,
or to demonstrate a physical or conceptual phenomenon”

Table 1. Some pre-1966 definitions of “document” cited by Buckland (1997).

Some further definitions of “document” cited by Buckland, all except the
last focusing on the supposed materiality of documents, are listed in Table 1
(emphases added). The last is from Suzanne Briet (1894–1989)—the French
librarian who co-founded the Union française des organismes de documentation in
1931 and published Qu’est-ce que la documentation? in 1951, and who is
celebrated in library schools around the world for her recognition that a photo of a
star, a stone in a museum, an antelope in a zoo—all have “become physical
evidence being used by those who study” them (Buckland, 1997, p. 806) and
therefore can be considered to be documents.
Especially since the publication of Ron Day’s masterful translation and analysis
of Qu’est-ce que la documentation? (Briet, 2006), much has been written about
Briet’s supposedly structuralist and proto-semiotic approach to the definition of
“document.” Buckland infers from Briet four “rules for determining when an object
has become a document” (p. 806):
1. the object must be material (this despite the translation of Briet: “any
physical or symbolic sign ...,” emphasis added);
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2. it must have been someone’s intention that the object is to be treated as
evidence;
3. the object must have been processed in some way; and
4. the object must be perceived as a document.
Buckland then cites Day as specifying that it is “indexicality—the quality of
having been placed in an organized, meaningful relationship with other evidence—
that gives an object its documentary status” (Buckland, 1997, p. 806).
In contrast to the emphasis on the materiality of documents that pervades his
prior discussion, Buckland’s conclusions include (p. 808) the identification of an
“evolving” notion of “document” that has “increasingly emphasized whatever
function[s] as a document rather than traditional physical forms of documents.”
Buckland sees (p. 804) a move from a traditional concern with “text and text-like
records (e.g., names, numbers, and alphanumeric codes)” to “any phenomena that
someone may wish to observe: Events, processes, images, and objects as well as
texts,” and remarks (p. 808) that “The shift to digital technology would seem to
make this distinction even more important.”
Buckland never intended to provide comprehensive coverage, even of the time
period to which he limited himself. A few of the definitions that did not make it
into his survey, including one from Ranganathan, are listed in Table 2 (emphases
added). (Buckland did cite the famous Indian librarian, but the work he chose was
from a slightly later date than that of the one given here.)
Year

Author

Definition

1907

Institut
international
de
bibliographie
(trans.
Weitenkampf,
1908)

“anything which represents or expresses, by the aid of any signs
whatever (writing, image, diagram, symbols), an object, a fact or
an impression”

1943

American Library
Association
/
Thompson

“Any written, printed, or otherwise recorded item or physical
object that may serve as evidence of a transaction.”

1956

Ranganathan

“Record—made on more less flat surface or on surface admitting
of being spread flat when required, made of paper or other
material, fit for easy handling, transport across space and
preservation through time—of thought created by mind and
expressed in language or symbols or in any other mode, and/or of
natural or social phenomena made directly by instrument without
being passed through human mind and woven into thought
created and expressed by it.”
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1956

Mack & Taylor

“A single piece of written or printed matter which furnishes
evidence or information upon any subject.”

1957

Perry & Kent

“An arbitrary unit of recorded knowledge which furnishes
information upon a subject. A graphic record or group of such
records which are physically bound together or otherwise
contained or attached so that it may be recognized as a single
object. Examples of documents are books, reports, letters, films,
photographs, and tape recordings.”

1960

Wagner

“Any recorded information regardless of its physical form or
characteristics, and includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) all written material, whether handwritten, printed, or typed;
(2) all painted, drawn or engraved material; (3) all sound or voice
recordings; (4) all printed photographs and exposed or printed
film, still and motion picture; and (5) all reproductions of the
foregoing, by whatever process reproduced.”

Table 2. Some further pre-1966 definitions of “document” not cited by Buckland (1997).

Over the last century, various suppliers of definitions of “document” have
chosen to emphasize the supposed physical, material, or concrete nature of
documents. The first of Buckland’s (1997, p. 806) four “rules for determining when
an object has become a document,” inferred from analysis of Briet’s (1951)
discussion, points to materiality as a necessary condition. (Buckland’s translation
of Briet’s definition—which begins “any physical or symbolic sign ...” (emphasis
added)— might seem to contradict this inference, but other authorities cited by
Buckland certainly lie in the explicitly materialist camp; see Table 1.) We might
call definitions of this kind definitions of document-as-medium, since the idea they
promote is of documents as media, vehicles, or channels, for the storage and/or
carrying of messages.
At the same time, other definitions (including Briet’s) have been
constructed so as to emphasize a different kind of essence—not documents’
materiality, but instead their informative, evidentiary, or signifying quality. We
might call definitions of this kind definitions of document-as-message, since they
represent documents as aggregations of signs (i.e., messages or texts), for the
expression and/or transmission of meanings.
Thirdly, yet other definitions focus neither on documents’ materiality nor
on their signhood—i.e., not on documents as bearers of meaning, physical or
otherwise—but on their status as meanings in themselves. These are definitions of
document-as-meaning.
Compound definitions are those that simultaneously assign to documents
two or three of the essential qualities of materiality, signhood, and meaninghood
(where those latter terms stand for “being a sign” and “being meaning,”
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respectively). For example, Wersig & Neveling (1976) define “document” as “A
unit consisting of a data medium, the data recorded on it, and the meaning assigned
to the data.”
In Table 3 (emphases added), the highlights are presented, in chronological
order, from a list of more than twenty-five definitions extracted from glossaries,
dictionaries, standards, and other literature dating from 1966 through 2019.
Year

Author

Definition

1970

NATO Advisory
Group
for
Aerospace
Research
and
Development
/
Stolk

“a record of data, or a concept, in any form from which
information can be derived, e.g. a page containing data, a graphic
representation, a tape recording, or a book”

1971;
1977

Harrod [3rd & 4th
eds.]

“A work recorded in language or symbols, or by other means.”

1974

Society
of
American
Archivists / Evans
et al.

“Recorded
information
characteristics.”

1976

BS 5408

“A combination of a medium and the information recorded on
or in it, which can be used for consultation, study or evidence.”

1976

Buchanan

“Generic term for the information-bearing media handled by
librarians -- books, serials, sound recordings, films, illustrations
etc.”

1976

Unesco / Wersig &
Neveling

“A unit consisting of a data medium, the data recorded on it and
the meaning assigned to the data.”

1983

ISO 5127-1

“recorded information which can be treated as a unit in a
documentation process”

1983;
2013

American Library
Association
/
Young [2nd ed.];
Levine-Clark &
Carter [“4th” ed.]

“A physical entity of any substance on which is recorded all or
part of a work or multiple works. Documents include books and
booklike materials, printed sheets, graphics, manuscripts, sound
recordings, video recordings, motion pictures, and machinereadable data files.”

1984;
1988

International
Council
on
Archives / Walne
[1st & 2nd eds.]

“A combination of a medium and the information recorded on
or in it, which may be used as evidence or for consultation.”

1987;

Harrod [6th–10th

“A record which conveys information; originally an inscribed or
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1990;
1995;
2000;
2005

eds.]

written record, but now considered to include any form of
information -- graphic, acoustic, alphanumeric, etc. (e.g. maps,
manuscripts, tape, videotapes, computer software).”

2000

Wellisch

“A medium on or in which a message is encoded; thus, the
combination of medium and message. The term applies not only
to objects written or printed on paper or on microforms (for
example, books, periodicals, maps, diagrams, tables, and
illustrations) but also to non-print media (for example, artistic
works, audio and video recordings, films, machine-readable
records, and multimedia) and, by extension, to naturally occurring
or humanly made objects intended to convey information (for
example, zoo animals, plants in botanical gardens, museum
collections of hand tools, etc.).”

2001

ISO 5127

“recorded information or material object which can be treated as
a unit in a documentation process”

2003

Feather & Sturges
[2nd ed.]

“A record that contains information content. In common usage it
still normally means a piece of paper with words or graphics on
it. In library and information work, the term is however used to
mean any information-carrying medium, regardless of format.
Thus books, manuscripts, videotapes and computer files and
databases are all regarded as documents.”

2004

Reitz

“A generic term for a physical entity consisting of any substance
on which is recorded all or a portion of one or more works for the
purpose of conveying or preserving knowledge. In the words of
the communication theorist Marshall McLuhan, a document is the
‘medium’ in which a ‘message’ (information) is communicated.
Document formats include manuscripts, print publications
(books, pamphlets, periodicals, reports, maps, prints, etc.),
microforms, nonprint media, electronic resources, etc. ... Also,
any form printed on paper, once it has been filled in, especially
one that has legal significance or is supplied by a government
agency, for example, an application for copyright protection. ...”

Table 3. Some post-1966 definitions of “document.”

No particular synchronic trend is apparent in this data, but what is apparent
is (a) the wide variety of definitions, and of combinations of category memberships,
and (b) the fact that such combinations—that is, compound definitions—are more
common than single ones. I take this data as evidence for concluding that
documents are (or, at least, are typically considered to be) complex objects rather
than simple ones.
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The three-part compound definition corresponds partially to the four-entity
data model that lies at the heart of IFLA’s Functional Requirements for
Bibliographic Records (FRBR; 1998). This model distinguishes between works,
expressions of those works, manifestations of those expressions, and items (i.e.,
copies of those manifestations). Items are the only physical entities recognized in
this model; each item can be viewed as the medium for (or carrier of) a given
expression or aggregation of expressions, which in turn can be viewed as the
message(s) representing a given work or aggregation of works (see Figure 1). On
the face of it, at least two separate conceptions of “document” can be derived from
the WEMI (works, expressions, manifestations, items) model: one that treats
documents simply as items, i.e., as physical media; and a second that conceives of
documents as complex entities that exist simultaneously as material, signifying, and
meaningful things, i.e., as messages (expressions) and meanings (works) as well as
as media (items).

Figure 1. FRBR Group 1 entities and primary relationships (1998).

As a possible way of deciding between these two alternatives, we might
consider that, in the course of a discussion of the scope of FRBR (p. 8 of the final
report, 1998, emphases in original), the word “document(s)” is used eight times as
a synonym for “information resource”:
“... [U]sers may make use of bibliographic records for a variety of
purposes ...: to determine what information resources exist ...; to
verify the existence and/or availability of a particular document ...;
to identify a source ... from which a document can be obtained ...;
to select a document or group of documents that will serve the
information needs of the user; ....
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“... [T]he functional requirements for bibliographic records are
defined in relation to the following generic tasks that are performed
by users when ... making use of ... library catalogues:
● using the data to find materials that correspond to the user’s
stated search criteria (e.g., in the context of a search for all
documents on a given subject ...);
● using the data retrieved to identify an entity (e.g., to confirm
that the document described in a record corresponds to the
document sought by the user ...);
● using the data to select an entity that is appropriate to the
user’s needs ...;
● using the data in order to acquire or obtain access to the
entity described (e.g., ... to access online an electronic
document ...).”
Even though “document” is not subsequently used in the rest of the final
FRBR report, the clear implication is that, in the FRBR world-view, documents are
the sorts of things that are sought, found, selected, and acquired, as a result of
judgments made by catalog users as to the relevance of those things, given users’
needs and wants. Such judgments are made on the basis of assessments of
documents’ formats and contents—i.e., on the basis of evaluation of the qualities
of documents as media, as messages, and as (aggregations of) meanings. On this
reading, documents are not to be conceived primarily as physical items that have
the properties of instantiating given manifestations, given expressions, and given
works; rather, any given document is, simultaneously, a medium, a message, and a
meaning.
II
Lowe’s category theory
So much for an empirical survey of the various kinds of definitions of “document”
that have been suggested over the years. The results raise a question which demands
an ontological approach: in other words, it requires some input from the
philosophical subfield of ontology, the study of the nature of being.
One of the tasks of ontology that has been deemed more or less important
since at least the time of Aristotle is the identification of the “highest,” “topmost,”
or most general categories or kinds of things that exist in the world. Some
ontologists have established systems of top-level categories that are hierarchical in
structure, with one category containing all things at the very top, divided into a
small number of sub-categories, each of which is subdivided into a small number
of sub-sub-categories, and so on. Typically in such structures, the sub-categories at
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any given level are both exhaustive and exclusive, so that any individual thing is a
member of one and only one sub-category at that level. Figure 2, for example,
depicts the top-level structure proposed by the American philosopher Roderick
Chisholm (1916–99) in his A Realistic Theory of Categories from 1996.

Figure 2. Chisholm’s top-level ontology (1996).

One of the most well-known contemporary top-level ontologies is that
devised by the British philosopher Jonathan Lowe (1950–2014), who wrote as E. J.
Lowe and who was Professor of Philosophy for many years at Durham University
in England. Lowe’s system, which he promoted as a means of understanding the
foundations of natural science, rests on three basic binary distinctions. Lowe
distinguishes between universals and particulars, between substances and
properties, and between abstracta and concreta, in arriving at the structure depicted
in Figure 3. (The base diagram as presented here is lifted straight from one of
Lowe’s earlier publications. He would subsequently make some changes in his use
of terminology, and a few slight amendments to the base diagram are made in
Figure 3: “Properties” is merged with “Relations” to form a category of
“Attributes”; the place of “Relations” is taken by “Kinds”; and “Tropes” is replaced
by “Modes.”)
Questions about whether or not these distinctions may be sustained, and if
they can, how that may be done, have been among the most hotly debated in
metaphysics for more than two thousand years and it is certainly not my goal to
attempt to survey answers to those questions today. What I am going to do instead
is very briefly to characterize the distinctions that Lowe makes.
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Figure 3. Lowe’s top-level ontology (2003), amended.

Firstly, universals vs. particulars. “Even in this matter,” Lowe says (2003,
p. 8), “there is controversy.” Lowe conceives of universals as things that are
repeatable, that is, as things that may be “borne” or possessed by many different
particulars, at different times and places; whereas particulars are each “wholly
confined to a unique space-time location and cannot ‘recur’ elsewhere and
elsewhen” (p. 8). In other words, universals are instantiable (by particulars), and
particulars are not. Examples of universals include properties such as the property
of being red, and kinds such as the kind denoted by the word “apple.” Examples of
particulars include the apple I ate yesterday and the redness of that apple.
Lowe’s distinction between substances and properties is among particulars.
It is the distinction between objects and modes (or tropes). An object is “an entity
which bears properties but which is not itself borne by anything else” (p. 8), like
the apple I ate yesterday; a mode or trope is a particular that is borne as a property
by no more than one object (p. 9), like the redness of that apple.
We might say objects “instantiate” kinds, “exemplify” attributes, and are
“characterized” by modes. Similarly, attributes “characterize” kinds, and are
“instantiated” by modes (see Figure 4). Another way to think of attributes is as
property-kinds, in parallel with the substance-kinds that are instantiated by objects.
Objects are substance-instances, characterized by modes as property-instances. It
has sometimes been suggested that the so-called “four-category ontology” (Lowe,
2006) depicted in the so-called “ontological square” was first proposed by Aristotle,
and on this basis Lowe and others in his camp are known as proponents of neoAristotelian metaphysics. (The version of the ontological square presented in
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Figure 5, by the way, was lifted from a 1997 article by Barry Smith, about whom
we shall hear more in Part III.)

Figure 4. Lowe’s ontological square (2003).

Figure 5. Smith’s ontological square (1997).

The third basic distinction that Lowe draws in his top-level hierarchy is
among objects (that is, among substance-instances), and it is between abstract
objects and concrete objects. Concrete objects are those that exist in space-time
(that is, are “datable and locatable”) or at least exist in time, whereas abstract
objects are those that do not. Examples of concrete objects include individual
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apples; examples of abstract objects (according to Lowe) include numbers, sets,
and propositions. A different criterion that may not coincide exactly in its picking
out of abstract objects is the capability of an object to enter into causal relations: an
abstract object is one that is incapable of such interaction.
Controversy abounds in relation to the category of abstract object. For
example, Lowe identifies propositions as a canonical sub-category of abstract
object. But in what sense are propositions conceivable as particulars (that is, noninstantiable) rather than as universals instantiated by sentences (expressions of
propositions) and in turn by utterances of those sentences in physical (spoken or
written) form? Similarly, in what sense are works—often conceived as
aggregations of propositions—comprehensible if not as universals instantiated by
copies of those works in physical form?
Another bone of possible contention has to do with the category of concrete
object. Two sub-categories of concrete object highlighted by Lowe (2003, p. 5) are
masses, or material bodies, and living organisms:
“Entities belonging to these two categories have quite different
existence- and identity-conditions, because a living organism, being
the kind of thing that is by its very nature capable of undergoing
growth and metabolic processes, can survive a change of its
constituent matter in a way that a mere mass of matter cannot. A
mere mass, being nothing but an aggregate of material particles,
cannot survive the loss or exchange of any of those particles, any
more than a set can undergo a change of its members. As a
consequence, it is impossible to identify a living organism with the
mass of matter which constitutes it at any given stage of its
existence, for it is constituted by different masses at different
stages.”
Lowe does not clearly establish what other sub-categories of concrete object
there are. The category of artifacts is one obvious candidate, but Lowe has little to
say about artifacts in general or sub-categories of artifact more specifically, which
means we are forced to speculate a little about where in his scheme certain entities
might fit. In a 2014 paper entitled “How real are artefacts and artefact kinds?” Lowe
distinguishes between utensils and machines as sub-categories of artifacts, arguing
that machines and machine kinds, like natural kinds, are fully and mindindependently real, whereas utensils and utensil kinds—things like “tables, chairs,
tents, cooking pots, knives, and hammers” (Lowe, 2014, p. 24)—are not. In the
conclusion to this paper, he says “I should stress that I am not urging that machines
are the only real artefacts. I am content to allow, for instance, that works of art may
well qualify as real artefacts too” (p. 26, emphasis in original). At the beginning of
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the paper, however, he had already stipulated that he was “setting aside here
putative examples of abstract artefacts, such as musical scores, conceived as types
rather than tokens” (p. 18, emphasis in original), thus leaving tantalizingly open the
question as to whether works of art should be counted as particulars at all.
The important question for the would-be ontologist of documents, then, is
the question of where in such a system of categories documents fit. Are documents
universals or particulars? substances or properties? and so on? It’s a question that’s
not as easily answered as it might at first seem. We might have an inkling of the
difficulties now that we’ve conducted our survey of definitions of “document,” and
especially now that we’ve distinguished between the ideas of document-asmedium, document-as-message, and document-as-meaning.
In particular, if we cleave to a compound definition, we might expect to
have to do some extra work in situating documents among what are typically
conceived as exclusive categories. And if it turns out that the concept of
“document” is too “complex” for easy placement in a top-level ontology, so be it;
the ontology must be revised to accommodate our concept of the thing, not vice
versa.
One way to proceed is to start at the top of Lowe’s hierarchy, and attempt
to justify our choice of placement of “document” on successive branches.
Beginning at Level 0, as it were, the first question is, Are documents things or not?
The answer is, Yes. Since the intention is that all things fall in the top category of
“things,” documents should be treated as things. So far, so good.
At the next level down, Level 1, the question is, Are documents universals
or particulars? Almost immediately, we run into a problem. On the one hand, if we
consider the document-as-medium option, it seems to be fairly clear that documents
are particulars (that is, they are non-instantiable). On the other hand, if we take any
of the other views (simple or compound) on the nature of documents as suggested
by the survey, we implicitly commit to a conception of documents as instantiable,
just as (some, but not necessarily Lowe, would argue) works and propositions are.
Let’s continue, for the time being, on the assumption that the document-asmedium option is the more attractive. In that case, documents are particulars. At
the next level down, then, Level 2, the question becomes, Are documents objects
(substance-instances) or modes/tropes (property-instances)? The simple answer is
that, since documents are the bearers of properties, and are not borne by anything
else, they are clearly objects, not modes. Next!
At the next level down, Level 3, the question is, Are documents abstract or
concrete? Even for the document-as-medium conception, there is uncertainty here
created by the absence of artifacts among the sub-categories of Lowe’s concrete
object. But this is probably a limitation of the presentation of Lowe’s hierarchy and
a reason to revise that presentation rather than a reason to place documents-asmedia in any category other than concrete object. So far, so simple.
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If we make a retreat from our choice of document-as-medium, and consider
how to handle documents-as-messages and documents-as-meanings, as well as
documents-as-combinations, we need to go back to Level 1, and ask again, Are
documents universals or particulars? In these cases, the conception is of documents
as instantiable—that is, documents as texts or works that exist as types rather than
as tokens. In the absence of a motivation to apply any theory that differentiates
between the type/token distinction and the universal/particular distinction, our
decision should be to consider documents as universals.
Moving down to Level 2, the question becomes, Are documents substancekinds or property-kinds (attributes)? Since documents are characterizable, the
simple answer is substance-kinds.
So we have a situation where on the one hand, documents “live” in a new
sub-category of concrete objects, possibly called artifacts, where the challenge will
be to identify the qualities that distinguish documentary artifacts from nondocumentary artifacts (if there are such things as the latter); and on the other hand,
“document” is placed in the category of “Kinds.” There is actually a third
possibility not suggested by our navigation through Lowe’s hierarchy, but which is
nevertheless suggested by Lowe’s characterization of the category of abstract
objects as including not just the sub-categories of numbers and sets, but also
propositions. If works are considered to be aggregations of propositions, then it
might seem that works should also be placed here; from work, it’s a short step to
document-as-meaning, and thus to thinking of documents as abstract objects.
Ideally we would use different words to refer to these different concepts.
But we do not. We use a single word, “document,” interchangeably in different
contexts to mean different things. Perhaps this is no bad thing. It keeps us on our
toes. But I want to suggest that much of the time, many people use the word
“document” to mean something that is a universal, not a particular—something
that’s not necessarily material. And I think that that is important for our
understanding of documents, and for our ideas as to where document theory could
or even should be going.
In essence, my argument is an empirical one about the use of language.
What do we talk about when we talk about documents? Much of the time, the
properties of documents that we are most interested in are properties of documentsas-meaning, or if you like, documents-as-works, documents-as-universals,
documents-as-types that are multiply instantiated by physical tokens. Of course, it
is important to recognize the existence of, and to understand the nature of, the
type/token relationship, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the sole or even the
primary focus of document theory should be on the materiality of document tokens.
Instead, or at least in addition, understanding the universality of document types
should be high on our agenda.
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We have reached the end of Part II. In the third and final part of the talk, I
should like briefly to discuss what I take to be the most substantive contribution to
the ontology of documents of the last few years.
III
Smith’s ontology of documents
The philosopher Barry Smith published a short conference paper called “The
ontology of documents” in 2011, following up on a presentation on a similar topic
from 2005. In these and several related papers on his so-called “theory of document
acts,” Smith has developed an account of the status of documents in the context of
the picture of social reality painted by fellow philosopher John Searle over a period
of several decades (see, e.g., Searle, 2010).
This work is not really about categories per se, but is ontological in the sense
that it explains how documents—or more precisely document acts like signing a
document, filling it in, delivering it, or archiving it (see Figure 6)—have the effect
of bringing new entities into existence, that is, how document acts have ontological
consequences.

Figure 6. Smith’s list of document acts (2005), amended.

Smith builds on John Searle’s ideas about speech acts—the things we do
with words. Searle explains how certain kinds of speech acts—the ones he calls
“declarations”—can bring about changes in the ontology of social reality, and
Smith similarly describes how certain kinds of document acts—generally speaking,
the things we do with rather than to documents—bring into existence not just
physical entities like document tokens, and document-related artifacts like filing
systems, but also document-related social practices and quasi-abstract entities (“at
one and the same time subject to historical changes yet not made of physical parts,”
Smith, 2011, p. 2, emphasis in original), especially in the realms of commerce, law,

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/docam/vol6/iss1/1
DOI: 10.35492/docam/6/1/1

16

Furner: The Ontology of Documents, Revisited

and government. These quasi-abstract entities are things like organizations,
contracts, laws, money, rights, obligations, identities, claims, privileges,
corporations, capital, permissions, debts, trusts ... that is, they are entities that form
vitally important parts of social reality.
Smith argues that we need to pay more attention to document acts than
Searle does. His primary reason for doing so is to address issues relating to the
“anchorage” of digital documents to the people who created them, by implementing
systems for the certification of authenticity that are on a par with signatures and
fingerprinting for physical documents.
But in the course of setting this up, Smith also makes important
contributions to our understanding of the basic ontological categories to which
documents belong.
Firstly, Smith points out (as others have done before and since) how Searle’s
categorization of speech acts may be applied to documents. Thus we may
distinguish among documents that are representative, directive, commissive,
expressive, and declarative. Representatives “commit the [writer] ... to the truth of
... expressed proposition[s]”; directives “attempt ... to get the [reader] to do
something”; commissives “commit the [writer] ... to some future course of action”;
expressives “express the [writer’s] psychological state ... about a state of affairs”;
and declarations “bring about correspondence between ... propositional content and
reality” (Searle, 1975, pp. 354–361).
Smith is most concerned with declarations, those which are most clearly
generative of new entities. Smith uses the term “creative” rather than generative,
with the somewhat counter-intuitive result that he classes books (fiction and nonfiction), journal articles, maps, artworks as “non-creative”; on the other hand,
certificates, contracts, receipts, banknotes, licenses, agreements, filled-in forms,
passports, diplomas, medical records, meeting minutes, etc.—all have “creative
power” in social reality (see Figure 7).
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Figure 7. Smith’s list of examples of common (“creative”) documents (2005).

Secondly, Smith follows Goodman in distinguishing those documents that
are autographic, and those that are allographic. For Goodman (in Languages of
Art), a work of art is autographic “if and only if the distinction between original
and forgery of it is significant; or better, if and only if even the most exact
duplication of it does not thereby count as genuine” (Goodman, 1976, p. 113).
Painting, sculpture, and architecture are autographic; music, photography, and
literature are allographic.
The autographic/allographic distinction seems to correspond at least
roughly to the distinction between documents that exist as both types and tokens,
and those that do not tokenize a type (see Figure 8). Briet’s photograph of a star?
Allographic. The stone in a museum, and the antelope in a zoo? Autographic. Many
of the “creative” document-types listed above? Autographic. Whether the
type/token distinction itself corresponds to the universal/particular distinction is a
complex matter that might be better left for another day, although clearly any
conclusions will be significant for our decision-making when it comes to situating
documents in a top-level hierarchy of categories like Lowe’s.
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Figure 8. Smith’s application of Goodman’s autographic/allographic distinction (2005).

Thirdly, and perhaps also significantly for that decision-making, Smith
seems to conceive of document acts, including document production acts, like
Searle’s speech acts, as events or occurrents, notwithstanding that the physical
records that are among the products of such acts are definitively classed by Smith
as continuants (eliding the type/token distinction). Might there be scope here for
further sub-categorization of concrete objects?
A more general question raised by Smith’s analysis is, What might be the
more productive route for DOCAM-style document theory to follow? On the one
hand, we might imagine a future document theory that commits wholeheartedly to
the distinction drawn by Smith between creative and non-creative documents,
carving out a subfield that focuses on the former and on kinds of issues identified
by Smith as critical for a digital social reality whose effective and efficient
organization depends so much on reliable authentication of autographic creative
documents. In this way we may contribute to the kind of “scientific understanding”
that Smith says is necessary for arriving at an “intelligent appreciation of the
changes in social reality that are being effected through the trillions of documents
being created daily in the digital realm” (Smith, 2014, p. 30).
On the other hand, might it be productive to extend the notion of declarative
documents’ creative or generative power so that all documents, including those that
Smith identifies as non-creative but that are traditionally the main concern of
document theory, are considered to be creative in some respect and/or to some
degree. Smith enumerates some of the kinds of things one can do to a document,
such as sign it, fill it in, register it, and archive it. It is surely a short step to take to
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consider that some other such document acts include finding it, identifying it,
selecting it, and obtaining access to it (just to choose those suggested by the FRBR
final report), as well as organizing it, classifying it, and indexing it, and reading it,
interpreting it, citing it, and using it, in many and various ways. Similarly, the
products of such acts include quasi-abstract entities of many and varied kinds,
including metadata, bibliographies, catalogs, result-sets, recommendations,
rankings, metrics, and networks, to name just a few.
And there I shall stop, with a reminder of my three conclusions, a list of
sources of definitions, and a list of references. I should like to thank my colleagues
Greg Leazer and Julie Park for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
talk, and to thank you very much for listening.
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